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Abstract
In 2003 and 2013, the World Health Organization convened informal consultations on 
characterization and quality aspects of vaccines based on live virus vectors. In the resulting 
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reports, one of several issues raised for future study was the potential for recombination of virus-
vectored vaccines with wild type pathogenic virus strains. This paper presents an assessment of 
this issue formulated by the Brighton Collaboration.
To provide an appropriate context for understanding the potential for recombination of virus-
vectored vaccines, we review briefly the current status of virus vectored vaccines, mechanisms of 
recombination between viruses, experience with recombination involving live attenuated vaccines 
in the field, and concerns raised previously in the literature regarding recombination of virus-
vectored vaccines with wild type virus strains. We then present a discussion of the major variables 
that could influence recombination between a virus-vectored vaccine and circulating wild type 
virus and the consequences of such recombination, including intrinsic recombination properties of 
the parent virus used as a vector; sequence relatedness of vector and wild virus; virus host range, 
pathogenesis and transmission; replication competency of vector in target host; mechanism of 
vector attenuation; additional factors potentially affecting virulence; and circulation of multiple 
recombinant vectors in the same target population. Finally, we present some guiding principles for 
vector design and testing intended to anticipate and mitigate the potential for and consequences of 
recombination of virus-vectored vaccines with wild type pathogenic virus strains.
Preface
The Brighton Collaboration is a global, non-profit, scientifically independent, largely 
volunteer research network created for the purpose of providing reliable, high quality 
international information and guidelines relevant to vaccine safety. One of many working 
groups within the Brighton Collaboration is the Viral Vector Vaccines Safety Working Group 
(V3SWG) that was formed to explore safety issues relevant to virus-vectored vaccines [1].
In 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) convened an informal consultation on 
characterization and quality aspects of vaccines based on live virus vectors [2]. One section 
of the 2003 report reviewed “regulatory issues for live viral-vectored vaccines”, including 
input from regulators representing the European Union, the USA (specifically the Center for 
Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), a unit within the Food and Drug administration 
(FDA)), China, and Health Canada. Among the issues raised by the Center for Biologics 
Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (CBER/FDA) was:
Recombination of a live virus-vectored vaccine with a circulating or reactivated 
latent virus could theoretically generate a more pathogenic strain. This would be 
less of an issue for vectors that share little homology with circulating/latent viruses. 
The risk of recombination should be studied if possible in a non-clinical model 
system, but should also be considered in clinical study designs.
Recombination was not explored further in the 2003 consultation, but was listed in among 
the “Recommendations to WHO and priorities for future work” as one of several “issues of 
critical importance to be investigated further”, specifically, “Potential of recombination with 
wild type pathogenic strains: Vector – circulation virus could create a more pathogenic 
strain; this issue should be addressed in vitro or in animal studies”.
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In 2013, WHO convened an additional informal consultation which reinforced concerns 
regarding recombination within the vaccine recipient [3]. Specifically, the report from this 
consultation states that “guidelines for characterization of the viral vector based vaccines 
have been harmonized and require the following” [among others]:
Demonstration of stability of insert/transgene by PCR, expression, passage in vitro 
and/or in vivo, as well as stability of the attenuated phenotype, i.e., investigate the 
potential for reversion, recombination or replication in the vaccine recipient
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the European Medicines Agency have 
published general guidance for use of recombinant virus-vectored vaccines [4;5]. The 
following report specifically explores the issue of potential recombination between virus-
vectored vaccines and wild type pathogenic strains of virus. Our intent is not to conduct an 
exhaustive review of literature, but rather to provide some salient examples to guide 
consideration of issues relevant to the topic.
Background
Virus-vectored vaccines
Virus-vectored vaccines are laboratory-generated, chimeric viruses that are based upon 
replicating (“live”) or non-replicating virus vectors into which have been spliced genes 
expressing antigenic proteins for a target pathogen. A live virus-vectored vaccine is 
biologically active and produces virus progeny in the vaccinated host but may be attenuated 
for pathogenicity either because of mutations in the vector, because of the chimeric nature of 
the vaccine itself, because the vector is used in a heterologous host, or due to a combination 
of these factors. A non-replicating virus-vectored vaccine is so severely attenuated that is 
cannot undergo a complete replication cycle in infected cells. Administration of the chimeric 
virus-vectored vaccine results in expression of antigen(s) of the target pathogen and 
induction of an adaptive and possibly protective immune response. At the time of this 
writing, only two virus-vectored vaccines have been approved for human use, specifically 
Imojev® [6] and Dengvaxia® [7–9]. Imojev® is marketed in Australia and Thailand for 
immunization against Japanese encephalitis virus infection. Dengvaxia® is approved in 
Mexico, the Philippines and Brazil for immunization against dengue fever. Both vaccines are 
based on the live yellow fever vaccine virus vector generically known as ChimeriVax [10]. 
In Imojev® and Dengvaxia®, the genes for the yellow fever virus virion structural proteins 
M and E have been replaced with the homologous genes from Japanese encephalitis virus or 
dengue virus respectively. Because Japanese encephalitis virus, dengue virus and yellow 
fever virus are all flaviviruses, these particular chimeras represent relatively subtle 
exchanges of antigens among closely related viruses. Numerous other virus-vectored 
vaccines using a wide range of vectors and targeting a variety of different pathogens are at 
various stages of research and development. Although currently the number of virus-
vectored vaccines available for human use is small, a variety of viral-vectored vaccines are 
available commercially for use in veterinary practice [11], demonstrating the promise and 
likely future use of viral-vectored vaccines in humans.
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Recombination describes a process by which nucleic acid sequences from two different 
parental viruses are exchanged so that the progeny contain sequences derived from both 
parents. Both RNA and DNA viruses may undergo recombination when two related genomic 
variants of a virus co-infect a cell. In viral systems there are three different mechanisms of 
recombination, dictated by the structures of the viral genomes. For DNA viruses, 
recombination occurs by the physical breakage and rejoining of parental DNA molecules 
through regions of sequence homology, in a fashion similar or identical to the same process 
in bacteria or higher organisms. For RNA viruses containing segmented genomes, gene 
exchange occurs primarily through reassortment of individual parental genome segments 
into progeny viruses, however intra, genic recombination has also been reported for the 
segmented orthomyxoviruses, reoviruses and bunyaviruses [12–16]. Recombination has 
been observed in several single-stranded RNA (ssRNA) virus families representing both 
positive and negative sense genomes both in the laboratory and in the wild; picornaviruses, 
coronaviruses, togaviruses and retroviruses, all with positive sense ssRNA genomes, display 
relatively efficient recombination [17–31]. The frequency of recombination among negative 
sense RNA viruses (excluding reassortment of segmented genomes) seems to be relatively 
low [31]. Recombination in RNA viruses, including retroviruses, is thought to occur during 
replication via "copy choice", namely switching RNA templates during replication with the 
result that the newly synthesized genome contains sequences from two different parental 
molecules [32;33].
While recombination clearly requires coinfection of a cell with two different viruses, the 
circumstances leading to such a coinfection in vivo are not clearly understood. Coinfection 
could theoretically result from infection with a heterogeneous population of viruses, by 
simultaneous or overlapping serial infections with different viruses, or by infection of an 
individual harboring a persistent, latent or reactivated infection with a different virus. 
Nevertheless, recombination among viruses in the human population clearly occurs as 
exemplified by a recent study describing interclade recombinants of varicella zoster virus 
[34].
Vaccine viruses in the wild
Although experience with virus-vectored vaccines in humans is limited, perspective on the 
issue of recombination between virus-vectored vaccines and wild type viruses can be 
informed by experience with traditional live, attenuated human virus vaccines and virus-
vectored veterinary vaccines. Vaccine viruses may establish a long-term reservoir in the 
wild, and recombination between attenuated vaccine strains and circulating wild type viruses 
or even between two different live attenuated vaccine strains has been documented. 
Specifically, evidence exists that vaccinia virus used as vaccine during the smallpox 
eradication campaign in Brazil has established a durable reservoir in the wild and is the 
cause of numerous cowpox-like infections in cattle and humans [35]. Likewise, the bovine 
herpesvirus vaccine may establish a latent reservoir in vaccinated animals which, through 
reactivation, may spread to other animals [36]. Numerous examples document probable 
recombination between live attenuated vaccine viruses and wild viruses. Phylogenetic 
analysis revealed recombination between wild, circulating strains of Newcastle disease virus 
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(NDV), an avian paramyxovirus, and attenuated NDV vaccine strains [37]. Attenuated 
viruses contained in the oral poliovirus vaccine frequently recombine with related 
indigenous human enterovirus strains to produce circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses 
(cVDPV), which can cause paralytic disease [38]. A reassortant Rift Valley Fever virus 
strain containing both wild type virus-derived and vaccine virus-derived genomic segments 
was isolated from a patient who received a needle stick injury while vaccinating sheep [39]. 
Analysis of two independently isolated disease strains of the pestivirus bovine viral diarrhea 
virus (BVDV) demonstrated that these strains arose via both homologous and non-
homologous recombination between a persistent BVDV strain and a vaccine strain, resulting 
in evolution of strains with enhanced pathogenicity relative to the parental strains [40]. 
Analysis of a strain of the poxvirus myxoma, originally isolated from a wild rabbit, suggests 
that it resulted from a recombination between a wild myxoma strain and a vaccine strain 
[41]. Genome analysis of a disease strain of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome 
virus (PRRSV), an arterivirus, demonstrated that it is a recombinant between an attenuated 
PRRSV vaccine strain and a field strain [42]. Additionally, recombination between 
independently derived attenuated avian herpesvirus vaccine strains can give rise to 
circulating pathogenic recombinant viruses [43]. Lastly and most extraordinarily, evidence 
exists that the retroviral disease reticuloendotheliosis was introduced into avian populations 
via contamination during development of fowlpox (a poxvirus) and Marek’s disease (a 
herpesvirus) vaccines, and now circulates in the wild as an integrated provirus in some 
fowlpoxvirus genomes [44]. All of these examples attest to the potential for genetic 
interaction between vaccine viruses and viruses in the wild. By contrast, it is noteworthy that 
more than 100 million doses of poxvirus-vectored recombinant rabies virus vaccine has been 
distributed in the wild in the United States, Eurasia and Western Europe resulting in 
reproducible reduction or elimination of wild rabies where applied and with no reports of 
recombination with wild type virus strains, attesting to the utility of recombinant vectored 
vaccines [45]. Furthermore, a wide variety of viral-vectored recombinant vaccines have been 
routinely used in veterinary practice for well over a decade with no recorded evidence of 
problems resulting from recombination with wild viruses [11]. Thus, while the occurrence of 
a recombination event is likely to be rare, the unanticipated consequences of such an event 
must be considered by developers and regulators alike.
Recombination between virus vaccine vectors and wild type virus strains
Although as described above, recombination has occurred between traditional live attenuated 
vaccine viruses and wild type viruses, to date there are no examples of recombination 
between virus vectored vaccine strains and wild type virus strains outside of the laboratory. 
However, on at least two separate occasions the possibility of recombination between viral 
vaccine vectors and wild type virus strains has been debated in the literature. One debate 
related to the development of ChimeriVax based vaccines [46–48] and one related to the 
development of Newcastle disease virus as a vector [49;50]. These debates defined some of 
the central concepts surrounding the issue of recombination between viral vaccine vectors 
and wild type virus strains. In the case of the ChimeriVax debate, most of the issues were 
ultimately addressed experimentally, thus providing a template for safety assessment of viral 
vaccine vectors, discussed in more detail at the end of this document.
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In summary, it is wholly feasible that virus-vectored vaccines could undergo recombination 
with naturally occurring viruses to produce hybrid viruses that could theoretically have 
undesirable properties affecting transmission or virulence. Especially given the entirely 
novel nature of chimeric viruses, prudence dictates that this possibility be taken into account 
in the design of virus-vectored vaccines. While medicinal regulatory decisions are made on 
the basis of risk and benefit considerations, the approach that has primarily been taken by 
regulators towards genetically-modified organisms has been that of the precautionary 
principle. Both types of regulatory decision-making (risk/benefit; precautionary principle) 
implore prudence and caution on the part of developers and the requirement for provision of 
evidence to support decision-making.
A framework for consideration of recombination between virus-vectored 
vaccines and circulating wild type viruses
The subject of recombination between virus-vectored vaccines and circulating wild type 
viruses comprises two overlapping sub-topics, namely, the probability that recombination 
will take place and the possible outcomes of recombination. The numerous variables 
affecting these issues are probably impossible to quantify accurately given existing tools and 
knowledge. However, the major variables that could influence recombination between a 
virus-vectored vaccine and circulating wild type virus and the consequences of such 
recombination can be identified and evaluated at least qualitatively during vaccine 
development. These major variables are:
1. Intrinsic recombination properties of the parent virus used as a vector
2. Sequence relatedness of vector and wild virus
3. Host range, pathogenesis and transmission
4. Replication competency of vector in target host
5. Mechanism of vector attenuation
6. Additional factors potentially affecting virulence
7. Circulation of multiple recombinant vectors in the same target population
Each of these variables is considered separately in the following paragraphs.
Intrinsic recombination properties of the parental viruses
As noted above, different virus families are associated with different intrinsic frequencies of 
recombination, and these intrinsic properties will affect the probability that recombination 
will take place. Generally, DNA viruses are subject to relatively high frequencies of 
recombination. Although RNA viruses generally display lower recombination frequencies 
compared to DNA viruses, retroviruses and some positive stranded RNA viruses 
(picornaviruses, coronaviruses, togaviruses, noroviruses), readily recombine. Other positive 
stranded RNA viruses recombine only inefficiently, and while recombination among 
negative stranded RNA viruses can be demonstrated on an evolutionary scale, the 
frequencies are sufficiently low as to make recombination under laboratory conditions 
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difficult to detect. Segmented viruses display extremely high rates of reassortment, and 
concern has been expressed that live attenuated influenza vaccines might readily reassort 
with circulating wild type strains [51]. One must assume that vectors based on virus families 
with segmented genomes or families prone to high recombination rates would also be most 
prone to recombination with related wild type viruses should the opportunity for 
recombination arise. For viruses of any given family, the intrinsic rates of recombination 
both in cell culture and in laboratory animals can often be determined experimentally, and 
recombination among related viruses in the wild can sometimes be deduced based on 
phylogenetic analyses. The intrinsic recombination properties of any given virus should be 
taken into account during vaccine vector development.
Sequence relatedness of vector and wild virus
For both DNA and RNA viruses, the majority of observed recombination events occur 
through regions of nucleic acid sequence homology between parental genomes. Thus, any 
sequence alterations to a vector that reduce homology with the wild type virus should 
theoretically reduce the probability of recombination between vector and wild type virus. 
Viruses can be attenuated by changing the genome sequence to substitute less common 
codons [52]. Sequences can be changed in silent positions such that the original amino acid 
sequence of the gene is preserved, but multiple substitutions of less frequently used codons, 
“codon deoptimization”, results in loss of virulence. Attenuation can also be achieved by the 
introduction of many uncommon combinations of pairs of codons, thus changing the “codon 
pair bias” [53]. Vectors engineered in this fashion should theoretically have a reduced 
frequency of recombination with wild type homologs. Alternatively, vectors intended for 
human use which are based on naturally occurring non-mammalian viruses, for example the 
use of canarypox virus as an HIV vaccine vector [54], are sufficiently divergent in sequence 
homology from mammalian viruses such that the probability of recombination between the 
vector and a mammalian virus in the vaccinated host should be lowered. Lastly, gross 
alterations in gene arrangement of a vector could suppress productive recombination with a 
wild type virus homolog [55–57]. Notably, non-homologous recombination among viruses 
does occur, albeit at a relatively low frequency, and manipulations to influence homologous 
recombination will theoretically not affect non-homologous recombination events. 
Furthermore, sequence homology is irrelevant in reassortment of genome segments in 
segmented viruses.
Host range, pathogenesis and transmission
The probability of recombination between two viruses should be directly proportional to the 
probability that a cell will be co-infected by the two parental viruses under consideration. 
The probability of co-infection, in turn, may theoretically be influenced by virus host range, 
pathogenesis (i.e. whether infections are normally acute, persistent, chronic or latent) and 
transmission. Considering the influence of host range, use of an avipoxvirus vector in 
humans or non-avian vertebrates should limit the potential for recombination of the vector 
with wild avipoxviruses [54]. Likewise, use of the avian Newcastle disease virus (NDV) as a 
vector in humans would present minimal opportunity for co-infection with the wild type 
avian virus, thus limiting the opportunity for recombination [49]. By contrast, use of a 
human adenovirus as a vaccine vector carries the clear potential for genetic interaction 
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between the vector and circulating human adenoviruses. Considering the influence of 
pathogenesis, one would expect that a virus that in the wild causes a latent infection in the 
target population would provide a greater opportunity for recombination compared with a 
virus that results in an acute infection. As a specific example, herpes viruses have been 
proposed as vaccine vectors [58]. Because a large fraction of the human population carries 
several different herpes viruses in a latent state, these latent wild type genomes could 
theoretically provide stable, persistent populations of virus genomes in a target population 
which could recombine with vaccine vectors. By comparison, if the vector parent usually 
undergoes an acute infection such as in the flavivirus yellow fever, the opportunities for 
recombination would be relatively rare. Transmission mechanism could also theoretically 
affect the probability of recombination between a viral vaccine vector and a circulating 
virus. For example, different species of arthropod-borne flaviviruses exhibit differences in 
observable recombination frequencies in nature attributable to differences in mechanism of 
vectoring by ticks and mosquitoes and by differences in both host and vector ecology among 
different flaviviruses [30].
Replication competency of vector in target host
The probability of recombination between a virus-vectored vaccine and a wild virus should 
be proportional to the virus load in a vaccinated individual, and thus limited by the 
replication competency of the vectored vaccine. Virtually all vaccine vectors are either 
defective for virus replication or naturally or artificially attenuated for pathogenicity in their 
target populations, and attenuation sometimes equates to reduced virus replication, hence 
reduced virus load and reduced opportunity for recombination. “Naturally” attenuated 
vectors comprise those in which a virus specific for one animal species is used as a vector 
for vaccination of another normally non-permissive species. Examples include canarypox 
virus and Newcastle disease virus engineered for use in humans as described above [49;59]. 
Canarypox in particular undergoes an abortive infection in non-avian cells, virtually 
nullifying the opportunity for recombination [60]. Vectors may be artificially attenuated 
using classic methods of serial passage in vitro or more modern methods involving 
engineered gene deletion or rearrangement. Modified vaccinia Ankara provides an example 
of a poxvirus vector attenuated by serial passage [61], the MRKAd5 HIV-1 clade B 
gag/pol/nef vaccine provides an example of an adenovirus vector artificially attenuated by 
deletion of the essential viral E1 regulatory region [62], and vesicular stomatitis virus 
vectors have been attenuated by rearrangement of gene order in the viral genome [57].
Mechanism of attenuation
The specific mechanism of attenuation impacts the consequences of recombination between 
a vaccine vector and a wild type virus. Specifically, if attenuation is genetically linked to 
transgene expression, reversion to virulence seems unlikely. For example, as noted above, in 
an adenovirus vector the transgene encoding an immunizing antigen may be inserted into a 
deleted E1A region [62] so that any recombination event that restores virulence to the vector 
also deletes the transgene and conversely transfer of the transgene to a wild type virus also 
transfers attenuation. Thus, theoretically, no recombinant should be more virulent than the 
vaccine vector itself. By contrast, in an attenuated vaccinia vector (MVA) multiple genes are 
mutated or deleted to confer attenuation, and the transgene is expressed only from one site 
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[61]. Recombination with a wild orthopox virus (cowpox virus, vaccinia virus or monkeypox 
virus) could in theory either “repair” some virulence mutations or transfer the transgene into 
a wild type virus background, generating a recombinant with improved replication properties 
relative to the original vaccine vector and also leaving the transgene expression intact.
Additional factors potentially affecting virulence
Vector designs have been proposed that incorporate expression of immune modulatory 
molecules, for example interleukins, to stimulate or otherwise regulate the immunogenicity 
of the recombinant vaccine [63]. However, in some cases these genes may act as virulence 
factors. For example, in a model poxvirus system, expression of interleukin-4 (IL-4) from 
ectromelia virus (a natural pathogen of mice; mousepox virus) enhanced the pathogenicity 
of the virus and conferred resistance of the recombinant virus to pre-existing immunity in 
infected animals [63;64]. Theoretically, recombination of a vector expressing such a 
virulence factor with a wild type virus could result in production of a wild virus with 
increased virulence.
Circulation of several recombinant vectors in the same target population
Although hypothetical, the possibility of recombination between two live recombinant 
vectors administered in the same population deserves some consideration. Two examples are 
provided. Attenuated vaccinia Tiantan [65;66] used in China for smallpox eradication is 
being assessed as a replication-competent vector for both HIV-1 [67]and H5N1 [68] 
vaccines and in its replication-defective form for hepatitis C vaccine [69]. Similarly, 
replication-competent adenovirus serotype 4 (Ad4) has been tested in humans as a vector for 
H5N1 [70] HIV and anthrax. Ad4 and Ad7 cause serious lower respiratory tract disease in 
military recruit training camps. Non-recombinant Ad4 and Ad7 vaccines proved to be 
among the safest vaccines, with more than 10 million military recruits vaccinated without 
serious adverse experience and the military continues to vaccinate recruits today with these 
vaccines [71;72]. The use of two different vaccines based on the same vector in the same 
population creates an opportunity for recombination which could generate a novel virus with 
potentially undesirable properties. A practical example with existing traditional attenuated 
veterinary vaccines is the recombination between two independently derived attenuated 
vaccines for infectious laryngotracheitis virus, a herpesvirus affecting commercial poultry, 
which regenerated a pathogenic wild type virus, cited above under “vaccine viruses in the 
wild” [43].
A template for investigations of recombination between live virus-vectored 
vaccines and wild type virus: experience with the ChimeriVax platform
The experience with ChimeriVax may serve as a template for analysis of the role of 
recombination in the development of vectored vaccines.
As introduced above, ChimeriVax is a live, attenuated recombinant virus platform 
constructed from the live attenuated yellow fever (YF) vaccine strain 17D in which the 
envelope protein genes of YF 17D are replaced with the corresponding genes of another 
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flavivirus [73]. The ChimeriVax platform has been used to develop live vaccines for dengue 
viruses (DENV), West Nile virus (WNV) and Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV).
Concerns have been raised that recombination between ChimeriVax vectored vaccines and 
wild type flaviviruses could generate a novel virus with enhanced pathogenicity [47;48]. 
These concerns have been addressed through a variety of studies including a review of 
evidence for inter- and intra-typic recombination among flaviviruses in the wild [74], 
laboratory tests for recombination among flaviviruses [74;75], and deliberate construction 
and testing of theoretical recombinants containing a heterologous envelope vaccine antigen 
in a wild-type vector background [76;77]. The results demonstrated intra-typic 
recombination among flaviviruses that occurred on an evolutionary scale in the wild and 
little or no recombination in cell culture, and that substitution of heterologous envelope 
proteins into a virulent flavivirus backbone results in a virus with properties of attenuation 
matching those of the attenuated vaccine vector.
For analysis of an existing vector or development of a new vector, new or existing studies 
such as those done for ChimeriVax, along with a thorough description of the distribution and 
host range of both the vaccine and the wild strains should effectively address the 
fundamentals influencing recombination between virus-vectored vaccines and wild strains as 
recommended by WHO and outlined in this document.
Guiding principles for vector design and testing
Consistent with the recommendations of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the 
European Medicines Agency [4;5], the potential for recombination with circulating wild-
type viruses should be addressed during development and testing of virus-vectored vaccines.
Rather than attempting to prepare specific guidelines for each vector, the Brighton 
Collaboration recommends that developers take the responsibility for assessing the potential 
for recombination between their virus-vectored vaccine and wild-type circulating viruses, 
taking into account the issues described above. Specifically:
1. Consider the evidence that members of the virus genus do or do not 
undergo recombination in the wild or under experimental conditions, for 
example in an animal model or in cell culture.
2. Given the vector design and mode of delivery, assess the magnitude of the 
opportunity for recombination in a clinical scenario.
3. Given the vector design, evaluate the probability that a recombination 
event with a wild virus could lead to a virus of increased pathogenicity. 
Consider the potential mechanisms whereby this could happen, and cite or 
conduct laboratory studies to evaluate those mechanisms.
4. Consider vector designs that could further reduce the probability of a 
recombination event, and enhance safety, while leaving the potency of the 
vector largely intact.
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5. Develop an optimized system for recombination and a strategy for 
detection of recombinants perhaps using current, sensitive assays for 
detection of expected viruses (e.g. PCR or infectivity assays) and new, 
broad methods for detection of novel viruses (e.g. degenerate PCR and 
massively parallel sequencing).
A place already exists for reporting the general conclusions of these investigations in the 
existing Brighton Collaboration templates for description of vectors [78]. The option for 
including a more detailed report can be considered.
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